Narrating Characters: The Making of a School Bully

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ABSTRACT: Jake was a popular sixth-grader at a local public school. He had plenty of friends and admirers, made good grades, and had adequate social skills. Jake was also a bully. Over the course of that sixth grade year Jake recruited a couple of friends, and then a much larger groups of peers, to target a classmate: Matthew. The school was quick to respond, but despite clear training, strong reprimand, and relentless surveillance the bullying of Matthew only stopped when he finally transferred to a new school. The next year Jake picked a new target: Trent. To date bullying research has largely employed empirical methodologies, including qualitative and quantitative approaches. This paper offers a fresh perspective, employing a missing philosophical lens toward the instantiation of bullying on the school campus. How might a bully – or a group of bullying participants – be narrated in such a way that he or she chooses violence or domination as a means through which to secure status? More specifically, what forces bear upon the experience of bullying, what cultures might its dominance mirror, and from where is its meaning derived? In considering these questions I employ the voices of two disparate philosophers; John Dewey and Michel Foucault.

Dewey argues that attitudes and dispositions are products of one's environment. As we engage in the cultures within which we live we move toward like-mindedness with those around us. While this common-sensical notion of cultural environing seems self-evident, it yet does not explain how a bully shows up within a culture that overtly and aggressively rejects bullying (e.g., schooling). Here, I turn to the work of Michael Foucault which provides us with tools to consider the ways in which schooling currently pits student against student in an ever present move toward standardization and normalization. I argue in this paper that bullying and schooling reflect the same culture; a culture that provides status by rising above (dominating) those around us. In this philosophical consideration of the phenomenon of school bullying, I not only analyze the cultures which guide dominating activities, but also suggest several re-imaginings of schooling itself; re-imaginings which may circumvent the move to bully before it begins. Ultimately this paper reminds us of the importance of

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attending to the normal ways we educate and the unintended consequences that form student attitudes, dispositions, and interactions.

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Introduction

How does a bully come to be? Is he or she the product of bad parenting? Are her or his aggressive tendencies the result of hanging out with the wrong crowd at school? Could the person simply be a bad egg; somehow born with a propensity toward delinquency and harming others? And, perhaps even more pointedly, what can we do to stop, even transform a bully? Does this happen through disciplinary training, rewards, punishment, and/or surveillance? Yet, what if we were to discover that the bullying which we seek to end actually mirrors the very structures which we employ to educate our youth?

In this paper, employing the post-structuralist lens of Michel Foucault, I consider bully delinquency, focusing specifically on Foucault's notion of character narration (or formation). I will argue that bullying, rather than mainly situated in innate delinquency, is in fact a narration of subjectivity. I also argue that bullying activities, rather than simply a product of unhealthy family life or poor teacher or peer modeling, are perpetuated by the educational discourses and training of schooling itself. Finally, I argue that effective anti-bullying strategies, rather than focused upon individual rehabilitation, must create new spaces of difference and value. I begin with a brief story to provide a canvas upon which to think more deeply about the ordinary ways which students are narrated toward extraordinary ends.

Jake was a popular sixth-grader at Southside K-8, a local public school. He had attended Southside since kindergarten, had plenty of friends and admirers, made good grades, and had adequate social skills. Jake was also a bully. Matthew was an unremarkable sixth-grader at Southside. Matthew had also attended this school since kindergarten and, up until his sixth-grade year, had cultivated good friendships and adequate grades. Matthew was sensitive and typically non-aggressive. In the fall of his sixth-grade year Jake and a group of classmates began to target Matthew in the daily bump game.[1]

This targeting was informal at first; Jake, Sammy, and Jeff seeking to always eliminate Matthew first from the game. The targeting

escalated as this group of boys encouraged others to join in the exclusion until the entire bump crowd (from 20-30 children) was seeking exclusively to knock Matthew out, purposefully missing shots to keep their friends in. In the end, the bullies gained a sense of status with many of these 30 children who would roar with laughter as Matthew, again the first to be eliminated and deeply humiliated, would walk away in tears.

The bullying of Matthew soon moved beyond the bump game to other parts of his day. Matthew, though he did not understand why, had become a pariah not only with the trio, but with a significant population of the school as well. The school administration was quick to respond. They corralled the perpetrators, reprimanded them, required them to undergo training (aimed at building empathy and better aggression management skills) and began to intensively monitor them. The bullying simply moved to more covert means; a look here, another form of exclusion there. Matthew was no longer invited to birthday parties. The bullying, though more subtle, continued. Matthew finally decided to transfer to a new school. Though adjusting well to his new school, he still carries the emotional scars of that sixth-grade nightmare. The next year, in the absence of Matthew, the trio simply picked a new target: Trent. When asked why he targeted Matthew one of the perpetrators matter-of-factly replied, "*because I like to make him cry*."

A large body of research has been directed toward the phenomenon of school bullying over the past 30 years. According to this research, it is believed that a number of realities guide the activities of school bullying. Delinquency (though recent literature avoids such terms) is one such reality. Here, the empirical literature views bullying activities as partially motivated by an outlier who is in need of reforming.

Curwin and Mendler propose four steps to create a violence-free environment:

- identify the school's core values;
- create rules and consequences based on these values;
- model these values, and
- eliminate interventions that are not congruent with these values, such as using sarcasm or criticizing students in front of others. (Cited in Orpinas, Horne, & Staniszewski, 2003, pp. 436-437)

Both research and experience show that one must also make use of sanctions – some form of negative consequence – for undesirable behavior (Paterson, Reid, Jones, & Conger, 1975; Patterson, 1982; Walker, Hops, & Fiegenbaum, 1976). The best results are achieved

through a combination of generous praise for positive activities and consistent sanctions for aggressive, rule-breaking behavior.

> Some possible sanctions are the following: Serious individual talks with the student; making the student sit outside the principal's office during some break periods; making the student spend one or more hours in another class, perhaps with younger students; making the student stay close to the supervising teacher during a number of recesses; sending the student for a serious talk with the principal; depriving the student of some privilege. (Olweus, 1993, pp. 86-87)

Behavioral or contingency contracting is a proven way to consolidate agreements forged in counseling sessions or in conflict-resolution negotiations. Contingency contracts are documents that spell out specific behaviors of participants.

> The behavior of former bullies spelled out in a behavioral contract must include a promise to refrain from bullying and a publicly observable definition of which behaviors constitute bullying. ... Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of contracting in the case of bullying is that the process of negotiation itself is propitious. In negotiating with a student, a teacher or counselor models the type of problem-solving behavior that should ameliorate bullying problems. (Hoover & Oliver, 1996, pp. 70-71)

On the other hand, to ensure compliance, bullies are reformed through surveillance. Their activities are monitored by teachers, parents, peers, and, ultimately, they also learn to watch themselves.

As previously reported, there is less bullying at schools that have a relatively high teacher density during recess and lunch time. Accordingly, it is important to have an adequate number of adults outside together with the students during break periods, and that the school provide good supervision of the students' activities – also during the lunch break (when students in many schools are left completely without adult supervision). A simple preventive measure is to make sure that the school has a smoothly functioning plan for recess and lunch time supervision (Olweus, 1993, pp. 70-71).

The intervention program is built around a limited set of key principles derived chiefly from research on the development and modification of the implicated problem behaviors, in particular aggressive behavior. It is considered important to try to create a school (and ideally, also a home) environment characterized by warmth, positive interest, and involvement from adults on the one hand and firm limits to unacceptable behavior on the other. "In cases of violations of

limits and rules, nonhostile, nonphysical sanctions should be consistently applied. Implied in the[se] ... two principles is also a certain degree of monitoring and surveillance of the students' activities in and out of school" (Patterson, 1986). Finally, adults are supposed to act as authorities at least in some respects (Olweus, 1993, p. 115).

Self-monitoring involves putting the student in charge of his or her own behavior. One version of this would be to have bullies tally aggressive words or actions that discount others' rights, such as name-calling or pushing. A more positive method is to have the student record positive, prosocial responses. For example, a student could record periods of time in which he or she engaged in selected positive behaviors, such as greeting others.

> A central feature of self-monitoring is that the child must learn to identify both inappropriate behaviors (for example, bullying) and appropriate responses. This 'educative' component may be as important for the success of self-monitoring as is attending to one's own behavior. (Hoover & Oliver, 1996, p. 72)

Was the bullying of Matthew a consequence of a deviant bully in need of rehabilitation? Was Jake simply a "bad egg" formed contextually within a less than ideal family, a character devoid of the cultural inhibitions that would mitigate anti-social behavior? To some degree the empirical literature views bullying as situated in the delinquency of the bully. The bully is seen as an individual who takes pleasure in the pain of an Other, or someone who is perhaps anti-social, or at the very least, a rule-breaker. Because bullying is an intentional activity typically involving unprovoked violence or torment toward a weaker victim, the bully is one who intentionally takes advantage of a weaker student. Bullies are problem students who must be disciplined, trained, and brought back into a position of healthy and appropriate social interaction.

Based upon these assumptions many current anti-bullying strategies involve rehabilitation. These strategies focus on reprimand (e.g., stern talks, behavioral expectations tied to clear rewards, and punishments), disciplinary training (e.g., anger management or social skills training, teacher modeling, behavioral contracting), and surveillance (including adult supervisors, teachers, peer monitoring, and self-monitoring). Southside certainly employed such methodologies. Jake, Sammy, and Jeff were called to the principal's office and reprimanded, the bump game was forbidden (as a sanction resulting from the bullying of Matthew during the game), Jake and his friends underwent anger management and empathy building skill programs,

peers were informed and recruited to put pressure on bullies to stop bullying and Jake (as well as Matthew) was watched (teachers were put on alert, recess personnel were notified, etc.). And yet, even after reprimands and training, in spite of close surveillance, Jake continued to target Matthew on a daily basis. In fact, these disciplinary moves, rather than curtailing Jake's bullying, actually pushed him to become more creative, more covert, and, thus, more skilled at bullying Matthew. It seemed that Jake was either beyond rehabilitation or that the right type of pressure aimed at his transformation had yet to be employed.

The view that some kind of delinquency is involved in bullying rests on three assumptions. First, bullying is seen to be situated in *individual* delinquency. Second, bullying activities mirror individual modeling (i.e., due to family interactions, poor teacher modeling, peer culture, etc., bullies have taken up similar activities of control and domination). Third, anti-bullying strategies aim to rehabilitate the bully through training (including models of teacher and student interactions), sanctions (including rewards and reprimands), and surveillance (including adult, peer, and self-monitoring). In this article my intent is not necessarily aimed at dismissing such notions. In fact, any or all of these realities may have been in operation to some degree in the Southside incident. Instead, in this project I wish to consider an additional, perhaps more hidden, and certainly more shocking possibility. Using the philosophical work of Michel Foucault I will consider the possibility that schooling and bullying are the fruit of one and the same discourse. I begin this consideration with a general introduction to Foucault's project

Disciplinarian Training and Subjectivity Narration
An Introduction to Foucault's Project

> The goal of my work during the last 20 years has not been to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. (Foucault, 1983a, p. 208)

By way of introduction to the work of Michel Foucault two general points regarding the nature of his project are worth mentioning. First, Foucault's work is not aimed at asking why certain understandings

come to be from an ontological perspective. Instead, his work is descriptive. Foucault seeks:

> To describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are the bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to uncover the different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated. (Foucault, 1972, p. 115)

Second, even though Foucault has analyzed a variety of systems and historical times, he does not attempt to construct a general theory to be applied to any and all situations. The beauty and immensity of Foucault's project is that it is culturally and historically specific. To understand, for example, how a bully shows up on a 21st century campus, one cannot simply transfer the findings of a genealogical study of Greek sexuality. The discourses and practices within which any subject exists are precisely the realities which must be investigated.

With this in mind Foucault provides three general understandings that become helpful in my consideration of the Southside incident. First, while Foucault would deny that he offers a methodology or theory which we may employ to analyze any culture, his larger agenda does involve the contention that individuals are discursively produced within larger systems of knowledges and discourses, which also have been constructed via discourses and concrete practices.[2] Foucault allows us, then, to consider not only the ways that "dividing practices" operated in the 19th century penal system (which I will discuss in the next section), but how similar practices may norm the subjects they are directed toward today. In fact, I will argue later in this paper that the institutions Foucault analyzes are congruent with the current institution of schooling in many respects, thus making his work particularly salient in considering the subjectivity narrations within schooling. Second, Foucault interrogates the nature of human subjectivity. "Foucault," write Dreyfus and Rabinow, "is seeking to construct a mode of analysis of those cultural practices in our culture which have been instrumental in forming the modern individual as both object and subject" (1983, p. 120). Foucault claims that his work has not been to create an analysis of the way power operates, but toward creating, "a history of the different modes by which ... human beings are made subjects" (p. 208).

This, then, brings me to a third component in Foucault's framework: that of the existence and operation of power. Regarding norming (i.e., the ways we come to a "common-mind"), Foucault envisions a power-knowledge complex that "invest[s] human bodies and subjugates[s] them by turning them into objects of knowledge" (1995, p. 28). Power,

according to Foucault, not only is repressive, holding subjects down, but also is productive, forming subjectivity. Power is "action that runs through and between things; power is first and foremost relational" (2003, p. 27). On this view, power is at work in the local structures that surround us, producing certain narrations of subjectivity, productions we often overlook because of their normalcy. Foucault's project, then, is aimed at identifying and resisting such norming voices, seeking to foster individual creativity while diminishing the subject normation wrought through individuation (which I will take up shortly). For Foucault power is always at work, whether subjecting one to another's control or creating subjects through the discourses and practices that surround us. Hence, Foucault's work attempts to unearth the ways in which subjects are formed by the operation of power through the discourses and practices within which they exist. I now turn to Foucault's work *Discipline and Punish* (1995) considering the narrations of subjectivities specifically within systems of disciplinary training.

Discipline and Punish

> The chief function of the disciplinary power is to 'train' ...Instead of bending all its subjects into a single uniform mass, it separates, analyses, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units. ... Discipline "makes" individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. (Foucault, 1995, p. 170)

In *Discipline and Punish* (1995), Foucault offers an example of what so-called subject production or narration looks like. Foucault seeks to elucidate the subject-narration that occurs as power operates in and upon the penal system. After a compelling and repulsive historical account of the legal torture of a criminal in the opening pages of *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault outlines the purpose of such a public spectacle: "Public torture and execution must be spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as [the law's] triumph. The very excess of the violence employed is one of the elements of its glory" (1995, p. 34). Initially punishment aimed at establishing the rule of the monarch. Foucault argues that the aim of public execution "is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength" (1995, pp. 48-49). From establishing the rule of the monarch to labeling the delinquent as outcast, penal activity was a spectacle aimed at norming the larger

population, revealing the power of the monarch and thus extending his iron fist over the larger population. But over time, crime came to be seen not as focused solely against the monarch, but against society itself. Here, "the right to punish has been shifted," argues Foucault, "from the vengeance of the sovereign to the defence of society" (1995, p. 90). Foucault asserts that punishment, initially focused upon revenge (i.e., an eye for an eye), historically moved toward a restriction of rights, then to an agenda of rehabilitation. More than a simple act, crime became focused on the criminal, an obsession with intent, propensity to harm, and character. Upon this view, penal activity moved toward an agenda aimed at transforming the character of the criminal. "Punishment ... will be an art of effects," Foucault writes, "one must punish exactly enough to prevent repetition" (1995, p. 93). Punishment moved toward prevention and rehabilitation and then ultimately toward training.

A specific technique proposed within the penal apparatus involved training through the *panoptic* system. Prisons were to be constructed so that the cells surrounded a central surveillance tower. Even open non-barred areas were positioned in such a way that when a prisoner was not in direct view of the tower itself, he or she could never be sure that someone was not watching from another vantage point.[3] "Each individual," explains Foucault, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication (1995, p. 200).

The key to the panoptic system is that all behavior would take place under the "watchful eye." In this training multiple aspects of life – behavior, time, speech, body, activity, sexuality – are observed and controlled. Here, the prisoner learns to watch himself, but, Foucault would argue, so do others as well (e.g., wardens, guards, etc.). The system norms all within its purview.[4]

Here, prisons become institutions of formation, making a better citizen from a delinquent. Surveillance and knowledge of the criminal allow us to rehabilitate him or her more effectively. Yet, Foucault provocatively asserts that, "Prisons do not diminish the crime rate: they can be extended, multiplied or transformed, the quantity of crime and criminals remains stable or, worse, increases" (1995, p. 265). Foucault contends that the real work of the penal system is not to rehabilitate the criminal, but to create and label that which is delinquent through discourses (about delinquency), knowledges (of the prisoner and the disciplines of rehabilitation), and surveillance, norming society at large

regarding illegality and delinquency. Foucault asserts that creating useful and docile bodies through the correct means of training becomes the focus of the penal system. The "prison," Foucault concludes, "has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency, a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous – and, on occasion, usable – form of illegality" (1995, p. 277). According to Foucault, defining delinquency is aimed toward narrating forms of delinquency which are less dangerous and more useful in society (e.g., a controllable delinquency that can be used to norm society at large).[5] For our purposes, I am interested in the methodologies of narration employed by such disciplinary technologies. Here I come to the important conception of what Foucault calls "dividing practices."

Dividing Practices

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault elucidates regimes of disciplinary power aimed at creating certain types of individuals. Foucault contends that:

> At the beginning of the seventeenth century Walhausen spoke of "strict discipline" as an art of correct training. ... Instead of bending all its subjects into a single, uniform mass, it separates, analyzes, differentiates, carries its procedures of decomposition to the point of necessary and sufficient single units. It "trains" the moving, confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements – small, separate cells; organizes autonomies; genetic identities and continuities; combinatory segments. Discipline "makes" individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. (1995, p. 170)

This "disciplinary power" was aimed at a normalization of the population, specifically through the individuation and ranking inherent in what Foucault calls "dividing practices." The individuation that is central to such "training" takes on two projects. First, dividing practices are aimed at dissecting the individual human being, exemplified in the training of specific aspects of the human body. "What was so new," Foucault inquires,

> In these projects of docility that interested the eighteenth century so much? ... To begin with there was the scale of the control: it was a question not of treating the body, en masse, "wholesale," as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it "retail," individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself – movements, gestures, attitudes,

> rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body. (1995, pp. 136-137)

Here discipline is aimed at usefulness, forging a body that is docile, a body that "may be subjected, used, transformed and improved" (Foucault, 1995, p. 136).[6] Hence, the body itself is divided into various parts or units. Training focuses upon the mind, or the arms, or the speech, or the ability to write legibly, and so forth. Technologies based upon certain knowledges of the one to be trained become clearly focused upon the training of specific individuations of the body. The body is divided into units (e.g., hands, legs, etc.) and these are, "then taken up separately and subjected to a precise and calculated training. The aim is control and efficiency of operation both for the part and the whole" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 153).

In a sense, we have here a mechanistic training of an efficient army where each hand, each leg, each eye has been sufficiently trained so as to offer maximum usefulness (i.e., the production of the ultimate soldier through the specific training of the individual parts that will come together to operate as a complete, effective, and well-disciplined whole). The disciplines, "notably the army and the schools – were quietly developing techniques and tactics to treat human beings as objects to be molded, not subjects to be heard or signs to be circulated and read" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 154). Hence, according to Foucault, the prisoner watched in the panopticon "is the object of information, never a subject in communication" (1995, p. 200). He argues that the same is true for the soldier and the student. Information of the object to be molded, effective techniques of molding and surveillance aimed at ensuring compliance become the main tools of the disciplinary enterprise. This dividing of the body also intimately involves the control of time and space. Foucault argues that the manner of such training,

> Implies an uninterrupted, constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its result and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement. These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called "disciplines." (1995, p. 137).[7]

According to Foucault, not only does disciplinary power seek to divide individual humans into their component parts in order to effect a more exact training; it also divides or individualizes one human from another. Normalization is exacted through routines of training, but also through routines of comparison and hierarchy. "Each individual has a place and

each place has its individual," writes Foucault (1995, p. 143). In an extended quote from *Discipline and Punish* we can now begin to understand how these disciplinary efforts become tied not only to the individualized training of the component parts of the object of discipline (e.g., arms, minds, hands, feet, etc.), but also to the individuation of one student from another. In fact, it is this individuation that becomes central to training itself. "The art of punishing," Foucault asserts,

> In the regime of disciplinary power, is aimed neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct operations into play: it refers individual actions to a whole that is at once a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and the principle of a rule to be followed. It differentiates individuals from one another in terms of the following overall rule, that the rule be made to function as a minimal threshold, as an average to be respected, or as an optimum toward which one must move. It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the "nature" of individuals. It introduces through this "value-giving" measure, the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved. Lastly, it traces the limit that will define difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the abnormal. ... The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it *normalizes.* (1995, pp. 182-183)

Hence, the way disciplinary power operates – remember that such practices are aimed at molding individuals – is through dividing students, not only into their component parts (i.e., hands, legs, arms, minds), but from each other through comparison. Students thus are directed toward the goal of the ideal student. The important point here is that one finds one's place, one knows one's progress, through individuation – through the way that one stacks up against others making the same journey. In essence, dividing practices not only individuate the person by creating individuals separated from other individuals: but they also establish grids of individual ranking in order to motivate and evaluate individuals. Foucault argues that "the Normal," that which becomes the aim of disciplinary practices,

> Is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education and the establishment of the *ecoles normales* (teachers' training colleges); it is established in the effort to organize a national medical profession and a hospital system capable of operating general norms of health; it is established in the standardization of industrial processes and

> products. Like surveillance and with it, normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age. For the marks that once indicated status, privilege, and affiliation were increasingly replaced – or at least supplemented – by a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body, but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and the distribution of rank. In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities, and to render the differences useful by fitting them on to another. It is easy to understand how the power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences. (1995, p. 184)

The training of a student in such *ecoles normales* is situated and motivated through the dividing practices of individuation; subjectivities narrated by grids of distributed comparisons and rankings. Measuring the "gaps" between students becomes foundational to motivating students to press forward, to move toward the norm. But remember, these aren't just gaps or separations. As Foucault argues, these gaps become "value-giving" (1995, p. 182) measurements. Status becomes associated with normalization, and how one is progressing toward such a goal is *compared* to the gaps between oneself and another. "Discipline rewards," writes Foucault, "simply by the play of awards, thus making it possible to attain higher ranks and places; it punishes by reversing this process" (1995, p. 181). Domination – the hierarchy of rising above another – becomes the means of status through individuation which in turn becomes both measurable and value-laden within regimes of disciplinary power and training and the dividing practices they employ. We are now ready to consider such practices as they play out in the delinquency implicated in bullying.

Narrations of Bullying Within Schooling

We imagine Foucault arguing that the Southside incident was simply proof of the efficiency of schooling. The interactions of Jake, the bump crowd, and Matthew followed the discourses of schooling within which they were situated. I believe that Foucault would be reluctant to use the word "bullying" (since naming the situation already sets it within certain preconceived frameworks), and yet he would likely argue that the concrete interactions involved in our opening story were fostered by the specific discourses and practices within which they were set. At a

more radical level, Foucault would argue that schooling and bullying are likely part of the same process of individuation – the creation of subjects measured by the gaps between them.[8] If we are to take Foucault seriously, school culture itself becomes complicit in the formation of the bully, the victim, and the space for bullying to become a viable option by which to secure privilege via an imbalance of power. Here, a brief example becomes helpful as we consider the ways that dominance status plays out in the gaps between students, providing for measures of value through hierarchy.

Schools today predominately motivate students through hierarchical individuation. For example, imagine an eighth-grade science teacher who announces on the first day of class that all students would automatically receive an "A" for a final grade. We imagine two responses in this scenario. First, motivation would likely decrease and students would not work as hard as they might in a graded system based on production assessment (i.e., they would let projects slide, not study as carefully for tests, etc.). Why? "*Because it doesn't matter anyway. Studying won't get me a higher grade*." Second, we imagine that parents (and students), especially those of upper grade ranges, would be upset. Grade differentiation reveals who works hard and who does not, who will make the cut and who will not, who will have the grades to get into Harvard and who will not. The assumption here is that differentiation is important both in school and in life. Hence, motivational discourse within schooling dictates that one finds one's place in comparison over and against one's classmates. Ranking becomes a means of motivation through differentiation.

By contrast, what if we established a system that valued connection (the quality of the relational interaction one establishes) over individuation (the way one stacks up against one's classmates)? Immediately, if this were the new criterion for a successful student, we imagine students might strive to compete to become better than their peers at connecting with others. Here the hierarchical system I have just described is repeated. Imagining schooling without such systems of ranking becomes almost impossible because of the normalized place comparison and ranking have become so ingrained. In fact, such discourses become so prevalent that we can no longer imagine alternatives. They become normal.[9]

It is not difficult to imagine that within such systems where students find status over and against other students a normation of the ways status is established in general terms. The motivational discourse of schooling involves the notion that if one works hard one will get

rewarded, and that reward is significant because of its differentiation (one becomes the star player, the star of the class play, the valedictorian, or a Harvard student while *others do not*). Some simply become worth more. While an in-depth Foucauldian analysis of school motivational discourse is beyond the scope of this paper, this brief example points to the ways that school discourse may fuel the *gaining-of-status-over-and-against-a-weaker-student* that bullying exemplifies. Disciplinary power operates via individuation and ranking. Bullying becomes a means of sizing oneself up against others who are lacking, a delineation of individuals based upon a discourse of hierarchical categorization employed within mainstream school motivational discourses. We imagine the bully's search for subjectivity (who really counts and who does not) being impacted by such discourses. If the bully can rise above the victim, then hierarchical status is established and subjectivity is solidified (Jacobson, 2007).

Foucault and Schooling

While this example certainly fits within the discourses of individuation and hierarchy that Foucault outlines within the penal system (*Discipline and Punish*) as well as in other systems (fields of mental health, medicine, and norms surrounding sexual practice), Foucault has not done an in-depth analysis of schooling itself.[10] Does this not weaken my contention that, from a Foucauldian perspective, schooling employs such disciplinarian structures, practices, and discourses? I close this section by briefly outlining the specific link Foucault makes between disciplinary practices and schooling. As quoted above, Foucault argues that early teacher training in the *ecoles normales* as well as in a variety of other institutions employed "a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body, but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and the distribution of rank" (1995, p. 184). Elucidating a Foucauldian understanding of disciplinarian power, Rabinow reminds us that for Foucault, such "discipline proceeds from an organization of individuals in space, and it requires a specific enclosure of space. Once established," Rabinow continues,

> This grid permits the sure distribution of the individuals who are to be disciplined and supervised. In a factory, the procedure facilitates productivity; *in a school*, it assures orderly behavior; in a town, it reduces the risk of dangerous crowds, wandering vagabonds, or epidemic diseases. [italics added] (1984, p. 17)

Foucault argues that in disciplinary practices, "the human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it" (cited in Rabinow, 1984, p. 182). This "blue print" method of producing citizens, workers, or normalized individuals, according to Foucault, was at work in "secondary education at a very early date, later in primary schools; [then] slowly invested the space of the hospital [as well as] restructured the military organization" (1995, p. 138). Further, Foucault argues, "the school building was to be a mechanism for training. ... The very building of the Ecole [military school] was to be an apparatus for observation; the rooms were distributed along a corridor like a series of small cells; at regular intervals" (1995, pp. 172-173). In the following extended quote Foucault directly indicates that schooling adopted the dividing practices that are at the heart of disciplinary training:

> Gradually – but especially after 1762 – the educational space unfolds; the class becomes homogeneous, it is not longer made up of individual elements arranged side by side under the master's eye. In the eighteenth century, "rank" begins to define the great form of distribution of individuals in the educational order: rows or ranks of pupils in the class corridors, courtyards; rank attributed to each pupil at the end of each task and each examination; the rank he obtains from week to week, month to month, year to year; an alignment of age groups, one after another; a succession of subjects taught and questions treated, according to an order of increasing difficulty. And, in this ensemble of compulsory alignments, each pupil, according to his age, his performance, his behaviour, occupies sometimes one rank, sometimes another; he moves constantly over a series of compartments – some of these are "ideal" compartments, marking a hierarchy of knowledge or ability, others express the distribution of values or merits in material terms in the space of the college or classroom. It is a perpetual movement in which individuals replace one another in a space marked off by aligned intervals. ... By assigning individual places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It organized a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding. (1995, pp. 146-147)

Foucault would contend that the penal system and schooling are unique and must be analyzed separately. Yet he argues that both schooling and the penal system employ practices of disciplinary power substantiated in dividing practices: the use of individuation and hierarchy to motivate,

train and normalize. And similar to prisons, such dividing practices in schools shape subjectivity.

While a thorough Foucauldian investigation into discourses, practices and motivations is called for, an initial consideration suggests a strong correlation between the "dividing practices" of early schooling and schooling today. For example, standardization of all students aimed toward a single outcome, examinations to measure progress, motivation based upon grade comparison or work comparison (better students are honored), grade listings for all to see (names are removed, but one knows how one stacks up compared to the class mean), honor roles (often printed in school newspapers), and so forth, are a normal part of schooling. These practices continue to be points of comparison and motivation within modern schooling. More than a genetic delinquent, the bully follows closely the pathways provided by the dividing practices of discipline employed by schooling. The bully learns that it is through dominance (ranking higher) that valued status is achieved.

I am now ready to consider the implications of a Foucauldian lens when focused upon delinquency and school bullying.[11]

Bullying and Delinquency

According to the empirical literature, a mal-directed disposition is one key focal point in bullying activities. Specifically, bullying is seen as precipitated by a bully who is an outlier, a "delinquent" in need of rehabilitation through disciplinary training and surveillance. Three important questions have been raised by my Foucauldian investigation into the delinquency implicated in bullying. First, in the bullying encounter, what informs *delinquency*? Second, in the bullying encounter, what is the field of the delinquency? Third, what becomes the means of mitigating the presence of bullying within schooling? I begin with the narration of bullying within the context of schooling.

Bullying Delinquency: Born or Narrated?

What realities informed the activities on that Southside playground? The bullying literature would argue that, on the one hand Jake was a "bad egg," a student who for some reason or other gained significant satisfaction in the tears of an Other. Jake needed to be rehabilitated, shaped in such a way so as to mitigate his desire to bully. Here, through reprimand, reward, punishment, and surveillance, Jake could be brought into line with what educators believed was a pro-social culture of schooling at Southside.

For Foucault, subjectivity does not stem from some deep meaning of the authentic person, but is intimately a product of the power which works in and through specific discourses and practices. Jake did not just show up at Southside: he was, according to Foucault, a product of the power narrating through specific discursive and nondiscursive realities operating in, around, and through him. Bullying, including the bully who takes up such activities, is narrated by operations of power embedded within and channeled through the concrete discourses and practices surrounding it (including the culture of schooling itself). Remember, Foucault argues that

> This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. (1983b, p. 212).

Here I argue that, instead of exhibiting the character of in-born delinquency, calling for skill training, reward and punishment regimes, and stern talks from the principal aimed at compulsory acquiescence, Jake was narrated within the culture of Southside; a culture that had surrounded him for six years. If attitudes and dispositions, including those motivating and taken up in bullying, are cultural narrations, then we must focus upon cultivating cultures that may narrate non-bullying dispositions. Newer, environmental approaches (e.g., Espelage & Swearer, 2004) are beginning to champion such a view. This, I argue, is a promising direction in anti-bullying work. My Foucauldian discussion has also helped us consider the field of delinquency, to which I now turn.

Bullying: Delinquency or Motivational Narration?

What was the field of the delinquency imagined on that Southside playground? If Jake was narrated, then what was the source of that narration? The empirical literature views the delinquency of bullying as stemming, to some degree, from certain family dynamics (e.g., dominance, distance) and perhaps from certain cultural realities within the school. In other words, family relationships, teacher modeling, and peer communities are to be analyzed and rehabilitated in order to exert pro-social pressure *upon* Jake. Though perhaps the product of poor family relations or divergent teacher modeling, Jake is yet the main site of intervention. After all, not everyone at Southside exhibited bullying tendencies. Jake is the main field of rehabilitation.

Foucault has helped us consider the possibility that Jake, instead, may be evidence that schooling itself is working. Of course, these are unintended consequences. Nonetheless, Jake simply mirrors more deeply the motivational discourses and practices of Southside. Certainly, there was a public non-bullying stance at Southside. But it seemed to have little effect on Jake. Jake, including his bullying, can be seen as a product not only of family, but of Southside itself.

Specifically, Foucault describes the dividing practices that create regimes of hierarchies, placing individuals in grids that become value-laden for the purpose of training. Dividing practices offer grids of individuation and comparison aimed at training, producing certain kinds of subjectivities, subjectivities that become valued in terms of their place within those hierarchical structures. Jake, perhaps arriving with bullying capacities instilled by family interactions, consciously or unconsciously took the notion of status-by-comparison (central to school discourse and practice) to its natural extreme. It is through domination, rising above others on grids of comparison, that one finds one's place within regimes of schooling. On Foucault's view, Jake's desire to establish a place for the Self followed the pathway of status offered by the motivational discourses of schooling.

The disciplinary power operating in the dividing discourses and practices of schooling – discourses and practices that provide value-laden grids of ranking through classification, examination, and knowledges – mirrors the workings of dominance inherent within bullying activities. Some may conclude that I am dismissing the importance of student decision-making in bullying behavior. Am I not suggesting that students, normed by their surrounding cultures, have little to no choice, and therefore hold no responsibility for their actions? This is not the case. The literatures on bullying and moral development do well to outline student responsibility regarding the choices they make. Rather than arguing that students are forced to make certain decisions by the iron-clad and coercive environments within which they live, I am instead arguing that those environments do indeed influence (though not completely control) the decisions that students make. Students who bully obviously choose to bully – they could, importantly, choose not to bully – but those choices are always influenced to differing degrees by the cultures that surround them.

Hence in the culture of schooling, students learn to find their place by comparing their rank with their fellow students' rankings. The discourse of who counts and who does not becomes linked with who dominates. The argument, here, is that the training discourses and

practices of schooling, aimed at a normation of ideal students and citizens through disciplinary practices become complicit in the hierarchical activities which bullying employs, shaping the decision-making processes which were active on that Southside playground. Not only are students narrated within the cultures of schooling: we might imagine that the formation and directives of certain desires (the desire to rise above) may also be normed within such cultures. Delinquency, here, is not centered in Jake, but in the culture that promotes status through dominance, through rising above an Other.

In sum, I argue that as bullying may be fostered by interactions or modeling of family, teachers, and peers, it is also narrated by the discourses and practices operating within schooling itself, discourses which attach value to grids of comparison. Of course, this claim calls for new research which carefully considers school motivational discourse and practice, analyzing the grids of individuation specifically constructed by such realities. This Foucauldian discussion has also opened up one final implication. I now consider the means of mitigating bullying.

Mitigating Bullying: Control of Freedom?

How do we go about offering spaces which might narrate students in ways that make bullying a less attractive means of status acquisition? The empirical literature, again to some degree, views transformation through control. Students are to be trained, informed, reprimanded, modeled toward (with the understanding that they should "take up" the behaviors being modeled) and watched. In other words, students are subjects to be molded. But remember: Foucault argues that "notably the army and the schools – were quietly developing techniques and tactics to treat human beings as objects to be molded, not subjects to be heard or signs to be circulated and read" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 154). According to Foucault, the soldier as well as the student "is the object of information, never a subject in communication" (1995, p. 200). The student is to be shaped toward a specific normation, rather than heard and allowed alternative aims.

While Foucault's earlier works (including *Discipline and Punish* – which was originally published in France in 1975) offer an account of the subject as a "docile and useful body" normed by the discourses and knowledges of the systems of normation, in his later works (e.g., *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure,* 1985, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 3: The Care of the Self,* 1986), he imagines agency

through what he terms "practices of the self." Margaret McLaren elucidates these practices. "Technologies of the self," McClaren asserts,

> Aim at self-transformation. Self-transformation [or we might better say self-re-narration] is to become other than what one is, to realize "the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do or think;" it is the creation of new possibilities, new forms of life achieved through technologies of the self. (2002, p. 146)

For Foucault, transformation begins by unearthing the operation of power in local concrete practices and systems. "Practices of the Self" involve the critical discovery of such instantiations of power as well as practices of re-narrating the self in opposition to some of the norms of such systems. In self-mastery the locus of control shifts from the system (or the norming voice) to the self (individual voice). Here Foucault imagines agency coming from seeing the self as a work of art. "What strikes me," muses Foucault,

> Is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? ... From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art. (cited in Rabinow, 1984, pp. 350-351)

While Foucault's notion of the Self as a work of art leaves much to be fleshed out, I argue that it does open up a fresh avenue in our anti-bullying strategies. If, as I have argued, the bully is a narrated character, one that is narrated within the hierarchical individuation centered upon motivating students to excel toward a norm (e.g., academic excellence), the power of such a system rests in each student's progress toward the same norm. Yet, adopting an understanding of each student, not as a site of molding, but as a person to be heard, alters this dynamic. Instead of value being exclusively measured through comparison on a trek toward standardization, value shifts toward radical expression. The move, here, is from control of students (forming citizens) to listening to students (freeing citizens).[12] Here, I argue that our anti-bullying efforts, rather than focused upon control and training of student populations, must instead allow students spaces of self-construction, self-expression, and self-meaning which discursively and practically value differences of aptitude, ability, insight, and perspective.

Conclusion

Through this consideration of the notion of disciplinary training through a Foucauldian lens, I have argued for an alternative notion of delinquency as it plays out in bullying relations. Rather than being situated only within the delinquency of a bully, bullying is better seen as a narration of the cultures within which it exists. Further, I have argued that bullying mirrors the dividing practices of schooling, discourses, and practices that create grids of value regarding student progression toward standardized objectives. Finally, I have argued that our anti-bullying efforts, rather than centered in control (in the same disciplinary practices which foster dominating relations), must instead attend to student difference and voice.

This is not to say that we cannot exert individual pressure on bullies to enact moral transformation (such as reward and punishment schemes, surveillance, etc.) with some degree of success. Instead, here, I raise the notion that the motivational discourses and practices of schooling, steeped in hierarchical comparison, are always counteracting those efforts. Further, I suggest that those discourses and practices might actually create a field, or culture, where bullying makes sense as one option available for student self-formation. This conception of the narration of bullying allows us to imagine its resistance to current anti-bullying techniques (such as skill development, delinquency rehabilitation, or informational approaches). If the bully finds that subjectivity (who really counts in school) is based upon rising above his peers, and carries a propensity (from family, history of relations, aptitudes, etc.) toward dominating relations, then a slap on the wrist, or even a school suspension, may have little effect. Students learn the value-laden game of hierarchy and individuation, providing meaning to the experience of who counts and who does not within schooling.

So what? What new strategies or fresh directions might these philosophers offer for schooling, particularly in light of my claim that bullying is situated within certain school cultures? Schooling is often based upon the notion of an older, wiser, more knowledgeable adult educating or molding a younger student. While I am not wholly discounting such a notion, schooling often neglects the importance of partnership with students; that is, allowing student voice and creativity to influence their own progress and direction. What Foucault suggests is that for students to create a sense of self they must be allowed to create such a self; a self that is unique.[13] In schooling we often, perhaps even primarily, motivate students through grids of value. Students

learn to find themselves in comparison to those around them. The problem with such regimes (dividing practices of motivation through hierarchical valuation) is that they work. Many students buy in, seeking to do well (which is always relative to how others do) in order to secure a better place in life after graduation. But, I have argued that while such practices do motivate, there are also disturbing consequences inherent in such spaces.[14] It is beyond the scope of this project to imagine how we might motivate in ways other than hierarchical comparison, but I argue that allowing for student voice and difference, spaces where student difference is valued, is a crucial key toward mitigating the attempt to construct selves through domination. Here schooling moves from student conformity (measured by comparison), to student creativity and expression (measured by individual voice); evaluation moves from grids of performance, to individual assessment. In schooling, then, the voice of the teacher is not the only voice to be heard. Instead, student voice and difference becomes an important component of student education; difference is non-comparatively valued. Here schooling moves away from standardization and toward individuation.

Jake was laughing. The bump crowd was roaring. And Matthew was crying. Quickly the Southside staff moved to protect (and train) Matthew and to reprimand, rehabilitate, and watch Jake. Jake was a product, so it was argued, of a bad family or bad genes. Yet, what we witness on that Southside campus is a lesson in subjectivity narration within systems of discourses and practices. The problem with Jake is that he took seriously the Southside story of who counted and who did not. Through domination, rising above his classmates, he was offered the prized position of star status; complete with the knowing smiles and slaps on the backs peers offered the trio in the midst of Matthew's demise. Jake, Sammy, Jeff, and the bump crowd didn't start out hating Matthew. Matthew was not a student that threatened those around him. But, he became a means to an end for the students who roared with laughter at his humiliation. They had risen above, they had basked in the limelight of his weakness, they became stars as Matthew was diminished. In the crucible of life, in the environments within which we live, subjectivity is narrated. What might it mean to create an atmosphere where students are measured not by how they compare with each other, but on the merits of their own unique voice? How might we create worlds within schools that mitigate the fear of being found out, that allow for openness, and, in turn diminish the desire to secure subjectivity through the dominance of bullying? How might we imagine

offering subjectivity to all students in ways that are not driven by dominance, hierarchy, or comparison? The tears of a sixth-grader, the laughter of a bump crowd and the star-status of a bully remind us of what it means to be human. They also remind us of the importance of attending to the *normal* ways we educate and the unintended consequences that form student attitudes, dispositions, and interactions.

NOTES

1. Bump is a recess game in which a long single-file line of participants forms facing a basketball hoop. The first person in line shoots from the free throw line. As soon as he or she shoots, the next person in line also tries to make a basket. If the person behind makes a basket first, the lead shooter is relegated to the sidelines. So it goes until one player is left, thus winning the bump game.

2. Foucault's work is centered in the operation of specific discourses, knowledges, and systems during specific times. He does not offer a universal methodology that we can simply apply to a wide range of other systems. Yet in his later works, Foucault does argue toward what he calls "technologies of the self," practices of seeking to understand the norming processes of the larger cultures within which we live, thus working to resist such enculturations (2003). Feminist research, seeking to better understand and also to combat the norming discourses which foster patriarchal domination have employed Foucault's insights toward just such ends (McLaren, 2002; McNay, 1992). Following Foucault's lead, schooling becomes yet another system to be considered, specifically asking how such a culture may narrate the characters within it; subjects such as bullies and victims. Further, while the panoptic system (which we will discuss shortly) that Foucault details within the penal system of the nineteenth century certainly is not a picture of modern day schooling – we do not have central towers in most schools – nevertheless anti-bullying strategies employing surveillance do hope to achieve similar ends – training the bully through monitoring and coercion. In sum, while we must be careful not to employ Foucault's elucidations of specific systems as a methodology or general theory of social norming, we may glean insights into the ways systems shape or narrate the characters that live within them.

3. "The Panopticon," Foucault describes, "is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad; in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen" (1995, pp. 201-222).

4. "Domination, then, is not the essence of power." When questioned about class domination, Foucault gives the example of social-welfare legislation in France at the end of the 19th century. Obviously he does not deny the realities of class domination. Rather, his point is that power is exercised

upon the dominant as well as on the dominated; there is a process of "self-formation or autocolonization involved" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 186).

5. The defining of delinquency, here, is not directed at rehabilitating the perpetrator, but toward revealing to society the monster they must not become. According to Foucault, it imposed a "highly specific grid on the common perception of delinquents: to present them as close by, everywhere present and everywhere to be feared" (1995, p. 286). The defining of delinquency, then "constitutes a means of perpetual surveillance of the population: an apparatus that makes it possible to supervise through the delinquents themselves, the whole social field" (p. 281). Here, prisons, the Panopticon and the defining and productions of certain forms of delinquency through disciplinary training become aimed toward a surveillance and ordering of society at large.

6. "According to Foucault," Dreyfus and Rabinow elaborate, "discipline operates primarily on the body, at least in the early stages of its deployment. Of course, the imposition of a form of social control over the body is found in all societies. What is distinctive in disciplinary societies is the form that this control takes. The body is approached as an object to be analyzed and separated into its constituent parts. The aim of disciplinary technology is to forge a "docile [body] that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved" (1983, p. 153).

7. "Control," write Dreyfus and Rabinow, "must not be applied sporadically or even at regular intervals. Standardization of operation, efficiency, and the reduction of signification necessitate a constant and regular application. ... To achieve this dream of total docility (and its corresponding increase of power), all dimensions of space, time, and motion must be codified and exercised incessantly" (1983, p. 154).

8. Of course, Foucault argues that this "narration of subjectivity" is often incidental, not the result of the conscious or intentional activities of school leadership. Such narrations become the unintended consequences of the discourses and practices within specific systems.

9. Ken Rigby cites research regarding the incidence of bullying at a Steiner school in England. The Steiner schools specifically work toward creating a non-competitive, non-hierarchical culture within the school. Rivers and Soutter reported that, "unlike other schools where bullying has been assessed, there were no reports of any physical bullying, although there was some teasing and indirect forms of bullying. The overall level of bullying behaviour was unusually low" (cited in Rigby 2002, p. 205). "The authors," Rigby adds, "suggest on the basis of this study that bullying is a 'situational problem' rather than one that is due to there being bully-prone personalities" (p. 205). Of course, this is one isolated study and one must be cautious to put too much stock in it, yet it does raise the interesting question – which I also pose – of a possible link between school disciplinary

and training discourse – often situated in hierarchy and competition (Othering) – and the similar hierarchical othering of bullying.

10. While space limitation and the focus of this project prohibits me from offering a literature review of Foucault's work and the ways it has been linked to educational endeavors, particularly within schooling, it is important here to briefly note that such a literature certainly exists (Roth, 1992; Biesta, 1998; Wain, 1996; MacNaughton, 2005; Martusewicz & Reynolds, 1994; Popkewitz and Brennan, 1998; Peters & Besley, 2007; Olssen, 1999).

11. In this analysis, I have mainly focused upon the grids of value established within schooling as students find their place through hierarchical comparison with their classmates. I have paid minimal attention to the *mode of delivery* of normalization, focusing instead of its effects. In other words, students are not only divided from one another, but by an even larger gap from school staff. While a detailed analysis of teacher/student hierarchies and their role in normalizing is beyond the constraints of this project, such relations of power become an important area of future research into the narrations of subject positions such as "bullies" and "victims" within schooling.

12. Two clarifications are important here. First, I want to be careful to not set up a binary, especially one that seems to suggest that listening to students allows for a "suppressed individual" to finally speak authentically. Foucault would adamantly argue that there is no essential person that we are trying to free by allowing them to speak. Instead, by allowing student voice we are allowing the possibility for new positions to be taken up within systems (such as schooling). Second, in my analysis I suggest two simultaneous directions: that schooling itself mirrors bullying and that some "bullying" is unacceptable (i.e., the bump game). Here, Jake and his bullying of Matthew is most certainly a problem, perhaps one that has been narrated within school, yet a problem that we must seek to re-narrate. Simply allowing voice (i.e., letting students do whatever they want) is not a solution to bullying. Instead, seeking to "norm" students toward democratic relations, understanding the ways schools may undermine such a project, is essential in our anti-bullying work. Here I argue that allowing students to recreate themselves may allow the space for a re-narration of status, not in any and all directions, but expressly toward more democratic interactions.

13. In fact, Foucault would argue that it's not so much that students should be allowed voice, but that students should, understanding the norming voices surrounding them, individually resist. Here students begin to create themselves as a work of art. But, I argue here that systems can change from the top down as well. Hence, those who construct schooling could, in Foucauldian fashion, re-imagine the importance of student voice and creativity in their own education.

14. I would argue that this type of motivation is a kind of "cheap motivation." It works, but only by pitting students against students, competing for the scarce resources available. They seek to be stars at the expense of an Other. If one stops playing the game of getting ahead (or outperforming) those around them, where, then, might motivation come from? I would argue that it would have to come from the much more nuanced place. The student would be required to be self-motivated by the subject matter itself, by the love of learning, by a curiosity to know, by a desire to understand in order to serve others or make a positive impact on their worlds, and so forth. With these kinds of motivations, grades, honor roles, and attendance pins are no longer are necessary, nor is comparison with a classmate who excels.

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